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Resumen
Si al pecado original, la imposibilidad que enfrentan los países emergentes para endeudarse en su
propia moneda con el exterior, se le suman imperfecciones financieras, se imponen castigos
macroeconómicos de dos clases: se aumentan y alargan los efectos de shocks adversos y se resta
efectividad a la política monetaria en su capacidad de absorber estos shocks. Pero esta condena
macroeconómica no es inevitable: en algunos casos, un cambio apropiado en la cantidad de dinero o
en el tipo de cambio puede estabilizar parcialmente la producción, la inversión y el consumo.
Abstract
Original sin, coupled with other financial imperfections, causes macroeconomic penance of two kinds:
adverse shocks have larger and more persistent effects and monetary policy becomes less effective as a
shock absorber. But macroeconomic damnation is not inevitable: in some cases, suitable changes in
money and exchange rates can still partially stabilize output, investment and consumption.
__________________
We are grateful to Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann, Carmen Reinhart and seminar participants at the
Inter-American Development Bank and Harvard University for comments, and to the National Science
Foundation and the Harvard Center for International Development for generous financial support.
E-mail: lcespede@bcentral.cl.1. Introduction
Original sin, deﬁned as a country’s inability to borrow abroad in its own currency,
is arguably the biggest obstacle that emerging markets face today as they endeavor
to become more integrated into the world economy. Original sin is increasingly
blamed for a host of macroeconomic ills: volatility of capital ﬂows, vulnerable ﬁs-
cal balances and instability of investment and output.1 T h eb a s i cs t o r yi ss i m p l e
enough. Having to borrow in dollars or other major currencies leaves local resi-
dents open to exchange rate risk. When, for whatever reason, the real exchange
rate depreciates, domestic balance sheets suﬀer. Locals with lower net worth ﬁnd
it harder to borrow abroad, and investment consequently goes down, perhaps
pulling output down with it. If the shock is big enough, default and bankruptcy
can take place. Understanding how vulnerable domestic corporations and banks
are, foreign lenders are jittery, running for the exits at the ﬁrst sign of trouble.
This closes the circle, making both capital movements and exchange rates volatile,
and exacerbating domestic exposure to currency risk.
The story is plausible, but it raises as many questions as it answers. First,
what exactly is the link between exchange rates, balance sheets, and the capacity
to borrow and invest? In the textbook IS-LM-BP model with well functioning
ﬁnancial markets and perfect international capital mobility, only expectations of
future returns, properly arbitraged, guide capital ﬂows and investment; corporate
balance sheets and current output levels are irrelevant. This suggests that other
ﬁnancial imperfections must be added to original sin to cause macroeconomic
damnation.
Second, how do these assorted ﬁnancial imperfections interact with exogenous
shocks? Does the response depend on the exchange rate regime in place, and how?
A plausible conjecture is that the imperfections magnify the eﬀects of shocks, but
that the precise magniﬁcation mechanism depends quite crucially on the accom-
panying exchange rate movements.
A third issue has to do with the eﬀects of exchange rates on aggregate demand
and output. Even if balance sheet eﬀects are contractionary, standard expenditure
switching eﬀects, which obviously have an expansionary eﬀect, are still present.
Which one prevails and when?
1The term original sin was coined by Hausmann and Eichengreen (1999). Calvo (1999)
and Hausmann et al (2000) were among the ﬁrst to warn about the dangers of dollarization of
liabilities. See also Krugman (1999) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
1This paper investigates these issues.2 For that purpose we develop a sim-
ple general equilibrium open-economy model in which real exchange rates play a
central role in the adjustment process, wages and prices are sticky in terms of
domestic currency, liabilities are dollarized, and the country risk premium is en-
dogenously determined by the net worth of domestic entrepreneurs, in the manner
postulated by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). Hence, all the basic building blocks
are there for unexpected real exchange rate movements to be ﬁnancially danger-
ous under original sin. In spite of the model’s apparent complexity, we obtain an
analytic solution for all variables of interest, which can be depicted in terms of
three familiar schedules: the IS and the LM, which correspond to equilibrium con-
ditions in the goods and money market, and the BP, along which the international
loan market is in equilibrium. This characterization helps to identify exactly how
the combination of balance sheet eﬀects and liability dollarization may lead to
departures from the standard framework. We show, for instance, that the eﬀect
of ﬁnancial imperfections is to change the slope of the BP, leaving the IS and
BP unchanged. This aﬀects comparative statics and the dynamic reaction of the
economy to foreign shocks, and can give rise to results that do not appear in the
standard model.
We distinguish between a situation of high indebtedness and the resulting
ﬁnancial vulnerability, so that a real depreciation raises the country risk premium,
and one of ﬁnancial robustness, in which the opposite happens. Vulnerability is
likely to occur when capital market imperfections are large (in a sense to be made
precise below), when total initial debt is large, and when the dollar share of that
debt is also large.
The paper makes three main points. First, devaluation may be expansionary
or contractionary, depending on initial conditions. It is always expansionary in
ﬁnancially robust economies, as it is in standard models without balance sheet
eﬀects. But if the economy is ﬁnancially vulnerable, several subcases arise. De-
pending on the extend of vulnerability, devaluation may still expand both output
and investment, it may expand output but cause investment to contract, or it may
be contractionary for both output and investment.
Second, the precise eﬀect of shocks depends jointly on the exchange rate regime
2An additional issue, which we do not study in detail here, is the uniqueness of equilibrium.
The story in which exchange rate movements cause an economic contraction, which in turn causes
capital outﬂows and exchange rate movements, has a strong ﬂavor of self-fulﬁlling expectations.
When are crises prompted by the shift to a “bad” equilibrium possible?For an analysis, see
Velasco (2001), Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2001) and Krugman (1999).
2in place and the extent of ﬁnancial vulnerability. Under ﬁnancial robustness, ﬂexi-
ble exchange rates cushion the eﬀects of adverse shocks, and they are the preferred
policy. Under ﬁnancial vulnerability, exchange rate movements can be stabilizing
or destabilizing, as we saw above. The domestic eﬀects of shocks then depend
on initial conditions and parameter values, and on the extent policy allows the
exchange rate to move. Under extreme ﬁnancial vulnerability, limiting exchange
rate movements may help limit the reaction of domestic output to shocks.
Third, for any exchange rate regime, the eﬀects of external shocks —such as a
fall in export volumes or an increase in the world real interest rate— are magniﬁed
b yt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁnancial imperfections. The magniﬁcation eﬀect is especially
sharp under ﬁnancial vulnerability, high original sin and ﬂexible exchange rates.
Real depreciation and a fall in aggregate demand can exert negative feedback on
each other: an initial depreciation reduces net worth sharply when dollar debts
are large, pushing the risk premium up and reducing investment. This in turn
may cause the relative price of domestic goods to fall (the real exchange rate
depreciates even further), causing another round of investment cuts. Toward the
end of the paper we explore the implications of this analysis for the design of
exchange rate policy.
2. The Model
There are two periods, t =0 ,1. Labor and capital are supplied by distinct agents
called workers and entrepreneurs. Workers work and consume an aggregate of the
domestic and foreign good. Entrepreneurs own capital, and also own the ﬁrms.
In order to ﬁnance investment in excess of their own net worth, entrepreneurs
borrow from the world capital market. For concreteness, we focus on the eﬀect of
temporary shocks only at the start of period 0.
2.1. Domestic Production
Production of each variety of domestic goods is carried out by a continuum of ﬁrms






jt , 0 <α<1 (2.1)
where Yjt denotes output of variety j in period t, Kjt denotes capital input and
Ljt denotes labor input. Assume that workers’ labor services are heterogeneous.











w h e r ew o r k e r sa r ei n d e x e db yi in the unit interval, Lijt denotes the services
purchased from worker i by ﬁrm j,a n dσ>1 is the elasticity of substitution









which can be taken to be the aggregate nominal wage. The jth ﬁrm’s maximizes
expected proﬁts in every period. Proﬁts are given by
Πjt = PjtYjt −
Z 1
0
WijtLijt di − RtKjt (2.4)
where Rt is the return to capital, and proﬁts are expressed in terms of the domestic
currency (henceforth called peso), subject to the production function in 2.1 and












t must be understood to include demand from domestic consumers and
investors and foreign consumers. Cost minimization yields the demand for worker




















4Finally, ﬁrms set prices for its diﬀerentiated product as a constant markup over













where, for any variable Xt, the notation t−1Xt denote its expectation conditional
on information available at t − 1.
2.2. Workers
There is a continuum of workers, whose total “number” is normalized to one. The
representative worker has preferences over consumption, labor supply, and real


















where υ>1 and ε>0. The consumption quantity Ct is an aggregate of home












t denotes purchases of a basket of the diﬀerent varieties of goods produced
domestically, CF
t purchases of the imported good, and κ =[ γγ (1 − γ)
1−γ]−1 is a
constant.













Assume also that the imported good has a ﬁxed price, normalized to one, in
terms of a foreign currency, which we shall refer to as the dollar.I m p o r t s a r e
freely traded and the law of one price holds, so that the peso price of imports is
equal to the nominal exchange rate of St pesos per dollar.
The only asset that workers can hold is money. Then, in every period t,t h e





it = WitLit + Tt − Mit + Mit−1, (2.13)
















F i s c a lp o l i c yi sa ss i m p l ea sc a nb e : i n ﬂation tax revenues are rebated to
workers through lump sum transfers:
Mt − Mt−1 = Tt (2.16)
where Mt =
R 1
0 Mit di. This assumption ensures that, in the symmetric equilib-
rium, workers consume their nominal income:
QtCt = WtLt (2.17)













where absence of the subscript i indicates that we have imposed symmetry in
equilibrium. Notice that Et is the price of foreign goods in terms of domestic
goods, or the real exchange rate.
Each worker optimally supplies labor to equate his marginal disutility of labor





Next adopt the convention that no subscript indicates an initial period vari-
able, while a subscript 1 indicates a ﬁnal period variable. Money demands in























Entrepreneurs borrow from abroad in order to ﬁnance investment. Assume that
entrepreneurs start with some inhered debt repayments, due at the end of the
period 0. Some fraction of debt repayments is denominated in pesos and the rest
is denominated in dollars. After debt repayments, these entrepreneurs borrow
from the world capital market in order to ﬁnance investment in excess of their
own net worth. Since we do not consider shocks in the second period, we can
assume without loss of generality that all new debt contracts (running from period
0 to 1) are denominated in dollars. Because of imperfections in ﬁnancial markets,
entrepreneurs are required to pay a risk premium over the risk free interest rate.3
Capital for next period is produced by combining home goods and imports.
For simplicity, assume that capital is produced in the same fashion as consumption
in 2.11. Therefore, the cost of producing one unit of capital available in period 1
is Q. The entrepreneurs’ budget constraint in period 0 is therefore
PN+ SD1 = QI (2.22)
where N stands for net worth, D1 denotes the amount borrowed abroad in period
0 (to be repaid in period 1) and I = K1 is investment in period 1 capital.
Net worth plays a crucial role because the interest cost of borrowing abroad is
not simply the world safe rate ρ. Entrepreneurs borrow abroad paying a premium
η above this risk-free interest rate. Assume that the risk premium is increasing
in the ratio of the value of investment to net worth (or what is the same, in the













For a derivation of this relationship from an underlying contract environment with
imperfect information and costly monitoring, see Céspedes, Chang and Velasco
(2000).
Capital depreciates completely in production. In equilibrium, the expected
dollar yield on capital must equal the cost of foreign borrowing









Given that entrepreneurs own local ﬁrms, rental on capital is not the only
income they receive. They also get the proﬁts resulting from the monopoly power
of ﬁrms. Entrepreneurs’ net worth therefore is
PN = RK + Π − SD
∗ − D = PY − WL− SD
∗ − D (2.25)
where Π is ﬁrm proﬁts in pesos, D∗ dollar debt repayment and D peso-denominated
debt repayment.
2.4. Equilibrium
Market clearing for the home goods require that domestic output be equal to








Notice EχX stands for the home good demand by the rest of the world, where
χ>0.
G i v e nt h a tp e r i o d1i st h eﬁnal period, there is no investment then. Assuming
that entrepreneurs consume only foreign goods, the market clearing condition for
the second period is
P1Y1 = γQ1C1 + E
χ
1P1X1 (2.27)












The appendix establishes conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium
when shocks are identically zero. The crucial condition is that ﬁnancial imperfec-
tions, as captured by the parameter µ, cannot be too big. We will assume hereon
that those conditions are satisﬁed.
8The next step consists in obtaining log-linear approximations of the model
around the no shock equilibrium. We start by deriving the equilibrium relations
in period 1. The ﬁrst relation is the log-linear version of equation 2.17:
q1 + c1 = w1 + l1. (2.29)
(Lowercase letters denote log deviations from the no shock equilibrium.) Equation
2.9 shows that wage income in period 1 is a fraction of the total revenue. Therefore,
p1 + y1 = w1 + l1 (2.30)
C o m b i n i n gt h e s et w oe q u a t i o n sw eo b t a i n
c1 = y1 − (q1 − p1)=y1 − (1 − γ)e1 (2.31)
Assuming no export shocks in period 1, the log-linear version of the market clear-
ing condition for period 1 is
y1 = χe1. (2.32)
Putting these last two equations together we obtain
c1 =( γ + χ − 1)e1.
Since under no shocks labor supply is ﬁxed at one (recall the ﬁrst order condition
for labor supply), we have
y1 = αi.





i = e1. (2.33)
Pulling together these results we arrive at






We can now solve the model in the initial period. The log-linear version of the
resource constraint in period 0 is
9τy+( 1− τ)(q + c)=λ(q + i)+( 1− λ)(χe + x) (2.35)
where λ =
γ ¯ QI
γ ¯ QI+ ¯ Eχ ¯ X < 1 and where, due to the assumption that prices are set one
period in advance, p =0 .4
G i v e nt h a tc a p i t a li sap r e - d e t e r m i n e dv a r i a b l ei npe r i od0 ,d e v i a t i o n so fo u t p u t
from its no-shock equilibrium will be matched by changes in labor only:
y =( 1− α)l (2.36)
Log-linearizing equation 2.17 we have q+c = l, since the nominal wage is pre-set.
C o m b i n i n gt h e s et w oe q u a t i o n sw ea r r i v ea t











−1¢¤−1 {λi +[ χ + λ(1 − γ − χ)]e +( 1− λ)x}. (2.38)
For a given e, the IS schedule slopes up in (i,y) space, and its position in that
space depends on the export shock x. A real devaluation (an increase in e)m u s t
increase y, given i,a n dt h eb e n e ﬁts of devaluation on current output naturally
increase with χ.
In order to derive the eﬀects of monetary policy we log-linearize money demand
in each period, given by equations 2.20 and 2.21. The resulting relations are:
ε(m1 − q1)=c1 (2.39)
εω(m − q)+( 1− ω)(c1 + q1 − q)=c (2.40)
where ω =1− β
Q ¯ C
¯ Q1 ¯ C1.N o t et h a tω i sb e t w e e n0a n d1a sl o n ga st h eg r o w t ho f
nominal consumption is not too negative, which we assume from now on. The
parameter ε−1 can be interpreted as the elasticity of money demand with respect
to consumption expenditures. Using 2.34 and 2.37 to substitute out the consump-
tions and rearranging we have the LM schedule:





















The ﬁnal block of equations to be solved is the one associated with the entre-
preneurs. The log-linear version of the arbitrage relation (equation 2.24) is
(r1 − p1) − q = ρ + η + e1 − s, (2.42)
while the log-linear version of 2.8 and 2.30 yield r1 −p1 = −(1 − α)i.U s i n gt h i s ,
the identity q =( 1− γ)e and 2.33 we have
µ




i = −(ρ + η)+γe (2.43)
The log-linear version of the equation for the risk premium (2.23) is
η = µ[(1 − γ)e + i − n], (2.44)
which is obtained using the fact that q =( 1− γ)e . The log-linear version of net
worth equation (2.25) is
n = θ
−1 £
1 − (1 − α)
¡
1 − θ
−1¢¤−1 (1 + ψ)y − φψe (2.45)
where ψ = D
T
N > 0, D
T
= D + SD
∗
i st h et o t a li n i t i a ld e b ti nu n i t so ft h eh o m e
good, and φ = SD
∗
PD
T is the share of dollar-denominated debt in total (initial) debt.
Note that when ψ is large, total initial debt is also large relative to net worth. If
initial dollar denominated debt is zero, then real devaluations have no eﬀect on
net worth.
Combining the last set of equations we obtain the BP curve:
i =
£






1 − (1 − α)
¡
1 − θ
−1¢¤−1 µ(1 + ψ)y +[ γ − µ(1 − γ + φψ)]e
o
Quite naturally, investment is decreasing in the world rate of interest. The other
two terms are more novel. Investment increases with output only if capital markets
are imperfect (µ>0), since higher output increases net worth and reduces the risk
11premium. Hence the BP curve slopes up in (i,y) space for a given real exchange
rate, and the intercept depends on the shock to the world interest rate. If µ =0 ,
t h eB Pi sh o r i z o n t a l .
Investment may be increasing or decreasing in the real exchange rate. Standard
arbitrage forces described above push for an increasing relationship: a higher e
makes borrowing abroad cheaper. But the balance sheet eﬀect pushes in the
opposite direction: a higher e means a higher value of debt payments, and hence
lower net worth and higher risk premia. It helps giving the possible cases a
n a m e .I fi nB Pe q u a t i o n2 . 4 6t h ec o e ﬃcient on e is positive, we have a ﬁnancially
vulnerable economy.I f t h e c o e ﬃcient is negative, we have a ﬁnancially robust
economy.N o t i c et h a tﬁnancial vulnerability is more likely when:
• The risk premium is very sensitive to the investment expenditure-net worth
ratio (large µ).
• The inherited ratio of total debt to net worth is high (large ψ).
• The share of dollar debt in total debt is high (large φ).
• The share of domestically produced goods in the investment and consump-
tion aggregate is low (small γ).
Notice that if initial dollar debt is zero (so that φ =0 ), devaluation can only
reduce investment via its eﬀect on input costs: a real devaluation increases the
cost of generating one unit of capital (in units of the home good), and therefore
increases the risk premium for any given level of net worth. But if capital is
produced only using home goods (γ =1 ) or if capital markets are perfect (µ =0 )
this eﬀect disappears.
2.6. Equilibrium under alternative exchange rate regimes
If the exchange rate ﬂoats (assuming predetermined output prices), expressions
2.38, 2.41 and 2.46 are 3 equations in 3 unknowns: output y, investment i and the
real exchange rate e, for a given money supply and exogenous shocks. Alterna-
tively, if the exchange rate is ﬁxed, e becomes policy-determined in the short-run,
and 2.38 and 2.46 pin down equilibrium investment and output. In turn, 2.41
yields the level of the money supply necessary for that particular equilibrium to
obtain.5.
5Recall these are percentage deviations from the no-shock steady state, holding prices and
wages constant. Without nominal stickiness, output is exogenous (pinned down by the inherited
123. Shocks, policies and their eﬀects
In the two sub-sections that follow we assume a ﬁxed (but adjustable) exchange
r a t e ,s ot h a tw ec a ns o l v et h em o d e ld i a g r a m m a t i c a l l yi n(i,y) space. We use that
solution to perform comparative statics and analyze the eﬀects of unexpected
external shocks and of an unexpected devaluation on equilibrium output and
investment. Later we consider the eﬀects of shocks under ﬂexible exchange rates.
3.1. External shocks under ﬁxed exchange rates
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀects of a fall in current exports, depicted in ﬁgure 1. The
shock shifts the IS up and to the left, so that for each level of investment there
is now a smaller corresponding output level. The new intersection is at point A,
with lower investment and output than in the steady state. The output fall is as in
the standard model with perfect capital markets and no balance sheet eﬀects, but
the fall in investment is not. In that model, a fall in exports today does not aﬀect
the proﬁtability of capital tomorrow, and hence it leaves investment unchanged.
That is what happens in our model in the special case µ =0 , so that the BP curve
is horizontal. Notice that with stronger balance sheet eﬀects (larger µ, φand ψ)
the BP becomes steeper, magnifying the adverse eﬀects on both investment and
output.
Consider now the eﬀects of a one-period increase in the world rate of interest.
In ﬁgure 2 the shock shifts the BP down and to the right, so that investment is
lower for each output level. The result is lower investment and output, as in point
A. This is qualitatively as it would be in the standard model with perfect capital
markets and a horizontal BP curve, but quantitatively there is a diﬀerence: for the
same downward shift, the steeper the BP the larger the reduction in investment
and output. The capital market imperfections and resulting balance sheet eﬀects
magnify the real eﬀects of adverse interest rate shocks.6
Next we put some numbers on these comparative statics exercises. This cali-
bra t i on s ho ul d no t b e i nte rpre t ed as a “ r ea l b us i n es s c yc l e ” e xe rc i s e  . Our purp os e
is only to illustrate and add some quantitative dimension to the previous analy-
sis. We set the structural parameters of the economy to generate three diﬀerent
cases. One case has no ﬁnancial frictions, so the presence or absence of original
capital stock and by equilibrim labor supply l =0 ), the IS and BP pin down the equilibrium
real exchange rate for a given output level, and the LM only determines the price level.
6T h es a m ei st r u eo fe x p o r ts h o c k s .
13sin is irrelevant. The other two do feature ﬁnancial frictions and diﬀer only in
the share of debt that is denominated in dollars: with full dollarization we have a
situation of mortal sin, while with a small share of the debt in domestic currency
we have merely venial sin. Table 1 displays the assumptions regarding the main
parameters of the model.
Table 2 presents the reaction of output and investment to a 1 percent increase
i nt h ew o r l di n t e r e s tr a t ew h e nt h ee x c h a n g er a t e( n o m i n a la n dr e a l )i sh e l d
unchanged. (Recall that since the exchange rate does not move on impact, the
degree of original sin is irrelevant in this case.) Financial frictions amplify the
shocks dramatically. The fall in output and investment are roughly four times
higher under frictions-plus-sin.
3.2. Policy shocks under ﬁxed (but adjustable) exchange rates
What are the eﬀects of monetary and exchange rate shocks in this model? First
we answer the question analytically and then we simulate some examples.
Start with a ﬁnancially robust economy. A depreciation of the real exchange
rate shifts the IS down and the BP up. This situation appears in ﬁgure 3. Both
output and investment unambiguously go up. This is just as in the standard
model: real depreciation is expansionary, and it can be used to oﬀset the real
eﬀects of adverse shocks.7
Turn next to the ﬁnancially vulnerable economy. Figure 4 illustrates the three
possible situations. The IS still shifts down, but now the BP shifts down as well.
The economy may settle in a point like A with higher output and investment (this
is an economy that is vulnerable but not too much so); a point like B where there
is a trade-oﬀ between investment and output; and a case like C where both output
and investment decline. The last one is the case of unambiguously contractionary
devaluation, and trying to use exchange rate and monetary policy for counter-
cyclical purposes can only make matters worse.
The intuition of why devaluation can be contractionary is simple: with imper-
fect capital markets, balance sheets matter; if there are enough inherited dollar
liabilities, the real depreciation worsens the balance sheet and increases the risk
premium; in turn, this pulls down investment and aggregate demand; if the stan-
7Notice that the presence of ﬁnancial imperfections has ambiguous eﬀects on the size of the
expansion. On the one hand, having µ>0 and δe large reduces the size of the vertical shift
in the BP; on the other hand, a large µ increases the slope of the BP, which magniﬁes the
equilibrium impact of any depreciation.
14dard demand-switching eﬀects of devaluation are not suﬃciently strong, the overall
impact can be contractionary.
Again, notice that none of this could happen with perfect capital markets. In
that case the BP is horizontal and shifts up after a real devaluation. The only
possible outcome is an increase in both investment and output.
Next we simulate some examples, using the same underlying parameters as in
the earlier simulations but stressing the role of diﬀerent degrees of original sin.
Table 3 shows the eﬀects on output and investment of an unexpected 1 percent
devaluation.
Without ﬁnancial frictions, the devaluation expands both output and invest-
ment, as in conventional Mundell-Fleming model. When the economy does display
ﬁnancial frictions, the outcome depends on the extent of original sin. With venial
original sin, the devaluation expands output by 0.3 percent but reduces invest-
ment by nearly 0.8 percent: the presence of ﬁnancial vulnerability makes the BP
shift down, moving the equilibrium to a point like B in Figure 4. With mortal
sin, output is unchanged while investment falls more: almost 1.1 percent.. This
underscores the role of original sin in determining the real eﬀects of exchange rate
policy.
3.3. External shocks under ﬂexible exchange rates
Turn next to the case of ﬂexible exchange rates, which we deﬁne as a regime in
which the money supply is constant and the nominal (and real) exchange rate
adjusts endogenously. Now the equilibrium involves, as pointed out above, the
solution to 3 equations in 3 unknowns, so a simple diagrammatic presentation is
not feasible. Instead, we go directly to a simulation. Since the LM schedule now
comes into play, we have to assume a value for the elasticity of money demand
(ε−1), which we set equal to 2.
Table 4 presents the eﬀects of a 1 percent increase in the world interest rate
under the constant money rule. A ﬁrst striking result is that this rule implies little
endogenous movement in the exchange rate in the robust economy (extreme case
with no ﬁnancial frictions at all), but much larger movements in the vulnerable
economy —especially so if original sin is mortal. Eﬀects on output and investment
diﬀer accordingly.
In the economy without frictions, ﬂexibility in the exchange rate has a sta-
bilizing role. Comparing this outcome with that of the same shock under ﬁxed
rates (recall Table 2), we see that the small depreciation under ﬂoating reduces
15the fall in output from 0.5 percent to almost zero, and dampens the investment
contraction slightly.
Things are more complicated if the economy does have frictions and original sin
is mortal, leading to extreme vulnerability. The endogenous depreciation is large
(19 percent), causing to a mild recession (output falls by 0.4 percent) and a collapse
of investment (it falls by 24 percent). If sin is merely venial, the depreciation is
milder, output is practically constant, and the drop in investment is held down
to 7.9 percent. Compared with the response to the same shock under a ﬁxed
exchange rate, we see that now the output fall is smaller, regardless of the degree
of sin. But the cost of the depreciation is a much larger fall in investment, with
the diﬀerence in the case of mortal sin being very substantial. This suggest it
is investment that is particularly sensitive to the share of dollar debt in total
indebtedness.
With original sin, the real depreciation and the fall in investment exert negative
feedback on each other, a factor which helps explain the magnitude of the equi-
librium movements in both variables. An initial depreciation reduces net worth
sharply when dollar debts are large, pushing the risk premium up and reducing
investment. If, on the other hand, the real depreciation does not increase exports
much (because the price elasticity of exports is low, as assumed in the vulnerable
economy), then total demand for domestically produced goods falls. This in turn
c a u s e st h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fd o m e s t i cg o o d st of a l l( t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ed e p r e c i -
ates even further), causing another round of investment cuts and so on, until the
system ﬁnally settles on a much lower investment rate and a sharply depreciated
exchange rate.
3.4. Implications for the exchange rate regime
The extent to which this cycle plays itself out, of course, depends on the reaction
of monetary policy. In the example above money is constant in response to the
shock. But if policy makers fear these contractionary eﬀects of depreciation,
then they might try to limit it by manipulating monetary policy, thus giving
rise to fear of ﬂoating. The model presented here has stark positive implications
for the choice of exchange rate regimes. If output and investment stabilization
are paramount objectives, one should observe countries with mortal original sin
(Argentina? Uruguay?) trying to limit exchange rate movements, so that their
observed reaction to shocks would resemble that of Table 2. Countries with only
venial original sin (Chile, Brazil) would welcome the endogenous movements in
16the real exchange rate, in which case their observed reaction to shocks would
resemble that of Table 4, last column on the right. Venial sin allows these latter
countries to enjoy stabilizing eﬀects of exchange rates (at least as far as current
output is concerned) that are not available to irredeemable sinners.
This all leaves open the question of normative rules to guide optimal mone-
tary and exchange rate policy. Optimality involves a lot more than output and
investment stabilization. And there may be intertemporal trade-oﬀs that the in-
formal discussion above ignores. In Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) we have
identiﬁed conditions for ﬂoating to be welfare-maximizing in a model much like
the one in this paper. There we show that ﬂoating can be optimal even with
mortal original sin as long as domestic and foreign goods are suﬃciently substi-
tutable in consumption and investment. Computing optimal policies for other,
more complex model economies, remains a task to be done.
4. Conclusions
Must original sin bring macroeconomic damnation? No, but it just might. Perhaps
the most striking implication of the model presented in this paper is that —with
ﬁnancial imperfections— macroeconomic outcomes depend crucially on the extent
of original sin.
But while all sinful economies are equal in this respect, some are more equal
than others. We have seen that other factors —the size of total debt regardless
of currency denomination, the sensitivity of the risk premium to debt levels, the
degree of openness of the economy, the price elasticity of demand for exports—
all matter in determining how the economy will react to shocks, including unex-
pected movements in the real exchange rate. There may be cases in which sinful
economies can use the exchange rate to oﬀset shocks, as in the textbooks.
The model presented here simpliﬁes perhaps a bit too much. Other links be-
tween ﬁnancial imperfections and the real exchange rate may also prove crucial.
Here local capitalists borrow to invest, so ﬁnancial imperfections aﬀect the de-
mand for investment and indirectly the real exchange rate. This leaves room for
monetary policy to aﬀect aggregate demand and potentially play a stabilizing role.
Alternatively, local producers could borrow abroad to pay for productive inputs.
In that case, shocks that aﬀected the risk premium (for instance by lowering net
worth) would cut domestic supply of goods directly, making it harder for aggre-
gate demand policies to play a useful role. This is an important issue to explore
17in future work.8
8We re thankful to Mick Devereux for making this point.
18A. Appendix: No shock equilibrium
Suppose that all shocks are identically zero, and let overbars denote no shock
equilibrium values. Then, from 2.19
¯ L = ¯ L1 =1
(as before, subscripts indicate future period values). Hence, domestic production
is
¯ Y = A ¯ K




¯ Y1 = τ ¯ E
χ
1 ¯ X1. (A.2)
Next, note that if there are no shocks,
¯ Q ¯ C =( 1− α)(
θ − 1
θ
) ¯ P ¯ Y (A.3)
so the goods market equilibrium condition for the domestic good becomes
£
1 − γ(1 − α)(1 − θ
−1)
¤ ¯ Y = γ ¯ E
1−γ ¯ K1 + ¯ E
χ ¯ X (A.4)
Since ¯ Y is given by AKα, the preceding equation is a relation between the no
shock values of ¯ E and ¯ K1. It is a schedule that slopes down in ( ¯ K1, ¯ E) space.
For a second schedule, write the interest parity condition 2.24 as
¯ R1 ¯ K1/ ¯ P1
¯ Q ¯ K1/ ¯ P0
=( 1+¯ ρ)
· ¯ Q ¯ K1




Note now that ¯ R1 ¯ K1 = α(1 − θ









(1 + ¯ ρ) ¯ E(1−γ)(1+µ)−1 ¯ K
1+µ
1 ©£
1 − (1 − α)(1 − θ
−1)
¤ ¯ Y − ¯ ED∗ − D/¯ P
ªµ
This is the no shock BP. Note that since ¯ Y , D∗ and D/¯ P are given, the preceding
equation is also a relation between ¯ E and ¯ K1.
This is a complicated expression. However, note that if µ is zero, this curve
must start from the origin and slope up in ( ¯ K1, ¯ E) space. Hence, if it intersects
the no shock IS, the intersection must be unique. By continuity, there is a unique
no shock equilibrium if µ is not too large.
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Figure 4: devaluation in 













Table 1: Parameter Values 
             
                       
    No Financial Frictions      Financial Frictions     
      Original Sin Irrelevant     Mortal Original Sin     Venial Original Sin    
                       
α  0.30   0.30    0.30   
χ   0.50   0.50    0.50   
β  0.99   0.99    0.99   
θ   2.00   2.00    2.00   
γ   0.45   0.45    0.45   
￿  0.00   0.20    0.20   
ε   0.35   0.35    0.35   
λ   0.42   0.42    0.42   
ψ     10.00  10.00  
φ     1.00    0.95   
                       
              
               
 
 
Table 2: Fixed Exchange Rates 
Response to a 1% increase in world interest rate 
         
                 
    No Financial Frictions    Financial Frictions   
                 
                 
Output     -0.50%    -2.00%   
          
Investment   -0.76%    -3.05%   
                 
         
          
 
 
Table 3:  
Response to a 1% unexpected devaluation 
             
                       
    No Financial Frictions      Financial Frictions     
            Mortal Sin     Venial Sin    
                       
Output     1.02%   0.00%    0.30%   
              
Investment   0.35%   -1.09%  -0.77%   
                       
             
              
 
 
Table 4: Constant Money Rule 
Response to a 1% increase in the world interest rate 
             
                       
    No Financial Frictions      Financial Frictions     
            Mortal Sin     Venial Sin    
                       
Exchange Rate    0.48%    19.00%   6.31%  
            
Output     -0.01%   -0.40%    -0.13%  
            
Investment    -0.60%   -24.00%    -7.89%  
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